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In the colonial days irrigation works were looked upon as commercial
ventures. Projects were required to cover annual operatingandmaintenance
costs and to meet the interest charges on the loan for capital and even
provide a profit. Many of the irrigation projects in India and Pakistan
were of this type and the Gezira project in Sudan is one of the latest
examples.
Currently, instead of making a profit that might supplement govern-
ment budgets~irrigationprojects incur losses and impose a growing burden
on the general revenues. This situation is partly the result of higher
construction,maintenance and operating costs. In addition the irrigationfees
charged irrigated farmers have not increased in absolute terms and in many
cases the percentage of farmers paying has also dropped.~’ Therefore costs
have been rising while revenues have declined.
Given this irrigation picture in many countries, including the U.S.,
what are some of the options available to extract more of the economic
surplus created by irrigation projects? The first section of the paper
lists the objectives of making charges for irrigation water. The second
section considers the types of fees or charges that are used to collect
—.—— ..—.— ——.——
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~/The terms--’’irrigation”, “fees” and “charges” are used inter-
changeably throughout the paper to mean the amount farmers pay for irrigation
water either per cubic meter or per acre.2
revenues from irrigated farms. The third and fourth sections present
discussions of some of the issues and factors that influence the type and
level of fees used.
Objectives of Water Charges
The main objectives or purposes of most water charges are to:
(1) recover some or all of the cost of providing the water and (2) influence
the allocation of water over time and among farmers. Generally governments
do not want irrigation projects to impose a burden on general revenues.
The costs that are recovered can be reinvested to help maintain the irrigation
systems and/or to improve growth and development in other parts of the
economy. There also may be some income distributional concerns involved.
If the economic surplus created by the irrigation is not collected, those
who benefit from the project may be made much better off relative to farmers
outside the project and to urban dwellers.
2/
The second objective emphasizes economic efficiency in water use.—
The concern is that “cheap” water will mean wasted water and an over-
investnlent in irrigation water supplies. Excess water use may not only
be wasteful but it can also cause dqmage in terms of water logging and
salinity. Appropriate water charges can be used to encourage efficient
cm-farm water use and provide signals for irrigation investment requirements,
~f Neghassi and Seagraves (1978) stress the difference between physical
and economic efficiency. Physical efficiency refers to the ratio of water
used by the plants to water diverted. As the value of water increases, it
becomes rational (economically)to increase physical efficiency by adopting
improved methods of controlling, measuring, and applying water, and to design
better systems of prices that will promote optimum allocation. Schramm and
Gonzales (1976) made one of the few studies that has documented the expected
relationship between the method of charging for irrigation water and physical
efficiency in its application.3




participate in its planning. In some cases the feedback regarding
of water and the quantity demanded could improve project design.
Bank encourages cost recovery from the users of at least the costs
of operation and maintenance, A study of 17 Bank pr~jects revealed that.-
on the average, users were paying back 29 percent of full costs (IBRD, 1974$
Table 2). In the U.S. the users have paid less than 19 percent of the cost for
federally sponsored irrigation projects. (Eisel and Wheeler, 1980)
Types of Water Charges
There are a number of ways the different types of charges can be
classified. At the risk of oversimplification,the following six categories
are used to examine the various water charges: (1) direct charges based on
measured volume of water, (2) direct charges per share of the stream or
canal flow or per irrigation, (3) direct charge per acre irrigated (may vary
by crop grown), (4) indirect charge on crop outputs marketed or on
inputs purchased such as fertilizer, (.5) development rebate or promotional
water charges, and (6) a general land or property tax, In some cases only
one type of fee or charge is used while in others a combination of fees
(i.e., fixed and variable or direct and indirect) may be used in an attempt
to meet project objectives, Each type of charge will likely have different
effects on water allocation efficiency, ease of collection, inputs use,
croppingpattern, adoption of irrigation and cost of implementation.
1. ,Volumetriccharges are best suited for water that has a high .—
value to the country and needs to be allocated efficiently, Farmers
are charged for the actual amount of water delivered to their farm headgate~4
One of the key problems with volumetric based fees is the cost of measure-
ment devices required to implement the system, If water is not high valued
the expenditure necessary for volumetric measurement is probably not
warranted.
Charges based on measured volumes
project that delivers water on demand.
delivery of water to the farms at times
are best suited for an irrigation
The demand system involves the
and in quantities as requested
by the water user. It is ideal from the user’s point of view, since it
permits irrigation at the time it is needed and in the quantities desired.
This delivery system offers many opp~rtunities to encourage efficient
use of water. Although fees based on measured volume are practical under
such a system this does not suggest that the same fee must apply to the
whole volume purchased by one user; free quotas plus penalties for exceeding
them, gradually increasing block charges, and declining block charges are all
feasible.~/
2. _s–.kased On s?a.leGreceived or numbers of irrigations is an
alternative system that provides soqe incentive to use water efficiently
and relates fees to the amount of water individual farmers receive. Here
a fa~mer is charged for the
per number of irrigations,
Pn the fl~w in the canal or
amount of time water flows into his field or
The actual amount of water received will depend
river (which will vary over time) as well as
with the time allpwed f?r each share or irrigation. Thus, the amount of
water delivered per share may vary among farms and time of the season.
~/Block charges mean that the price changes in steps or blocks. The
first 1000 cm3 will have one price whereas the second 1000 cm3 will have
a different price, etc. With increasing block charges, the fee will be
higher for the second quantity of water, whereas for a decreasing block
charge it will be lower.5
Charges based on shares is best suited for rotating irrigations where
water is delivered to the users along a canal in turns according to some
prearranged schedule. Rotation systems are usually based on proportional
division of stream or canal flows so that farmers receive shares of an annual
flow rather than a certain volume. Volumes associated with such shares may
be unknwn. A fixed delivery schedule makes it difficult for a farmer to
delay receipt of his water or to transfer it to someone else along a different
canal. A flexible schedule,
it necessary to inform users
at their farms, Thus a good
however, would also cause problems, by making
of changes in the time of arrival of the water
communications system would be necessary to
implement a flexible schedule.
Water charges based on shares ties the cost of water to usage. Some-
times, however, shares are converted to estimated volumes per hectare and
farmers are charged by the cubic meters they are estimated to have received.
Often they are charged according to hectares served or hectares of each
crop times a certain volume per hectare; this simply means that the water
charge is a land tax or a differential land tax for different crops,
3. This brings us to the charge per acre irrigated. Here charges
are collected from irrigated farmers based on the number of acres irrigated
or supposed to be irrigated. These charges may also be varied by crops
grown where crops that use more water have the highest water charge, i.e.




to discourage and low charges on crops they want to encourage. The
may also be varied by season. The higher charge being made in the
when water is more valuable to farmers.
Charges per acre will have no effect on the efficiency with which
water is allocated. The only exception to this is when the fees are
based on crops grown. In this case the fees may encourage crops that6
use less water per season. Fixed charges per acre are primarily a means
to collect funds and repay project costs. It is a way to collect some of
the economic surplus created by irrigation without causing too many dis-
tortions. It tends to work best if the same crop is grown throughout the
irrigated area for each season, Thus one charge can be fixed for each season.
If a land tax has been collected in the past the fixed charge for
irrigation may be fairly easy to collect. No measurement, counting of
irrigations or timing is necessary. In fact the fees can be collected by
any existing government agency that has contact with farmers. However,
if the charge is varied by crop grown the collection becomes more complicated.
Data then must be available on crops grown. Of course, farmers will under-
report acreage of high fee crops or pay government officials to under-report
high fee crops.
The fixed charge per acre is best suited for continuous flow irrigation,
where water flows continually through a canal on certain days and each farmer
is free to take whatever quantity he needs. In some systems water flows
continuously in the canals throughout the cropping season, The water itself
may have little value at the margin even though the delivery system may be
cQstly, Farmers, usually pay annual fees for access to the water and/or
contribute labor toward the maintenance of the canal, It is not practical
to estimate the amount of water used. Howevex, if the quantfty and timeliness
of water delivered varies by location on the canal this could become the
basis for varying charges.
If the system for allocating water among farmers is based on crop
priorities, then varying charges by type of crop grown may work best. In this
type of syste~ crops are assigned orders of priority which are normally
based on the economic value or importance of the crop. When water is in
short supply, priority crops receive water first. If water remains after7
irrigating priority crops then it is distributed to other
basically allows some crops to be saved during periods of
crops. It
drought. Water
charges would be set highest on the crops assured of getting water (high
priority) and lowest on those crops that have last priority and least
assurance of obtaining water.
4. Indirect Charges on inputs or outputs will have no
efficiency with which farmers allocate water. These charges
impact on the
are a means
to collect funds to repay project capital costs and cover operating and
maintenance costs. Ease of collection appears to be the main reason for
using such a system. When the government is the primary market for the
output, i.e. cotton or for the input, water charges can be collected at
the same time the farmer sells his crop or buys the input.
The major problems are that it gives farmers distorted incentives
concerning what crops to produce and provides no incentive for efficient
water use. If the fee is only placed on cotton, farmers may produce less
cotton and more clover or other crops. The government will lose both
revenues for water and cotton export sales, When inputs such as fertilizer
are taxed to pay for water this will discourage farmers from applying
fertilizer and lower production, Thus, with indirect charges governments
must be aware of the signals such charges
5, Another type of charge that has
are giving farmers.
been used is a developmental
fee or promotional fee. This has been used in projects that are under-
utilized when they are first opened. The idea is to encourage greaterwater
utilization with lower fees at the start of the project, Once an irriga-
ticm system is in place and there is excess water, the cost of adding
another farmer within the irrigated area is very low. The fees are usually
scheduled to increase over a 4 or 5 year period until they reach the desired8
level, However, increasing the fees once farmers are using the project
has proven not to be an easy task. A system of promotional fees would prob-
ably be used in an area that has had no previous irrigation and should be
combined with experimental plots and technical assistance for the farmers.
The technical assistance and experimental. plots are probably more important
than the promotional fees.
6. Finally taxes or fees may be levied on all lands and property in
the irrigated area or district. The idea behind such a tax is that the
irrigation increases economic activity throughout the area and everyone
benefits, It is not clear that this always happens but in some cases the
benefits from the irrigation project have spread throughout the area
benefiting businessmen, workers, and farmers. If this is the case, then
the economic surplus should be collected from businessmen and farmers alike.
Thus,ageneraltax onland orpropertycanbe usedto payatleast partof the
project’s cost. Other fees may also be imposed on farmers either because
they gain the most or to improve water use efficiency.
California’s irrigation districts recognized long ago the benefits
created in towns and cities serving the irrigated areas. They “acquired
the rights to include cities and to tax their lands at market value to
help finance the farmers’ irrigation water. Far from resenting this,
city voters have usually supported irrigation based issues by larger
margins than associated farm voters! In a few cases they have carried them
over a negative majority of farmers!” [Gaffney, 1969, p. 135]
The land tax or property tax like the charge per acre will have no
direct effect on water use efficiency although a high land tax will encourage
the highest valued use of the land. Still land taxes are primarily a method9
of collecting revenue from those benefiting from the project. It does allow
for a larger tax base to support irrigation projects and will allow local
areas or district to fund some of their own irrigation development.
If the tax is based on differences in land and property productivity,
lack of information may make it difficult to implement. Many countries
lack the data required to differentiate among various land and other
property values. Thus a property tax to pay for an irrigation project may
require a whole new data system for estimating property values.
Taxing power may also be limited to the bare land. This would prevent
the tax from focusing on early improvers, intensive farmers and prevent the
tax from retarding development,
Factors Affecting Methods for Financing Irrigation
Methods used for financing irrigation depend on many factors including:
the value of the water, demand elasticity, dependability of supply, ability
to control its flow, desires to subsidize agriculture, traditions of
ownership and water law, system capacity, return flows, drainage problems,
staff training, and information available. No one system is “best” for all
areas,
The Value of Water
As pointed out above, if the value of irrigation water is low to
farmers as is often the case, it may not be worthwhile to measure it or levy
charges based on volume. More accurate measurements and more sophisticated
systems for allocating resources tend to emerge the higher the value of the
resource. Better measurements and recordkeeping schemes would be adopted
when either the cost of measurements and administration falls or the value
of the water increases.10
In addition when water is in abundent supply and of low value to
farmers, even moderate charges may discourage irrigation. Thus, charges
may have to be varied by time of season to make use of the system
during periods of low water value.
Elasticity of Demand
A closely related issue is the price elasticity of demand for water.
Charges for water will have a greater impact on water use the more elastic
the demand. The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the percentage
changejn quantityassociatedwitha onepercent increasein priceor charge. If a
one percent increase in price brings a 3 percent decrease in quantity we
say that the elasticity is -3, or highly “elastic”. A very low price
elasticity of demand for water means: (1) changes in water prices will
have little effect on water use, and (2) water pricing will have limited
effectiveness as a method for rationing water.
In the very short run and at low water prices the elasticity of
demand for water is likely to be low. And, as the water fees rise and the
length of run increases the price elasticity increases. When charges
increase it becomes profitable to consider ways to use water more efficiently.
Higher water fees per volume or share received encourage farmers to adopt
better control methods and to shift to crops which use less water. There-
fQre, as the one goes from lower to higher fees, and as ane goes from
short-run to long-run water demand curves, the elasticity will increase
4/
and water fees will have a greater impact on water use efficiency.— —..-— .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ---- -.— -. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
4/Shumway (1973) found that at prices above $8,50 per acre foot for —
California-Aqueductwater, the price elasticity exceeded -1.0 and reached
-2.03 at $17 per acre foot. At $4.00 per acre foot the elasticity dropped
to -.48. Shumway’s derived demand can be characterized as a long-run
demand. In contrast Moore and Hedges (1963) found in Tulane County,
California, lower water price elasticities for what was a shorter-run
demand situation. They found price elasticities for irrigation water of
-.702 at higher prices and -.188 at lower prices.11
Dependability of Water
In many cases water is not sold at its highest value because
supplies vary a great deal depending on season, time of day, and other
factors. Some stream flows jump up and down from 20 percent to 400 percent
of their mean annual levels, in addition to seasonal patterns. [Gaffney,
p. 143] If the value of water fluctuates widely, it may be too much
trouble administratively to vary the charge. Hence, a low charge is
assigned to encourage full use in periods of abundance, and, then quotas
or regulations are used to allocate water among farmers in times of
shortage.
High fees and variable supplies raise the problem of who pays
if the water supply is short and the crop fails. This problem could
partly be solved by allowing for variable fees that depend on the
adequacy of water supply. If a farmer has a crop failure due just to
lack of irrigation water delivery,then the fee could be dropped or reduced
for that year. The decision about the fee could be left up to a committee
of farmers.
If technically and politically feasible some type of market system
works best with variable stream flows. Water users could bid each period
for water needed to irrigate their crops or buy water shares for future
irrigation. Water is allocated to the highest valued uses in each period
as the market adjusts quickly to the variable stream flows. Only part of
the water needs to be sold and a set base quantity could be allocated to
each farmer at soIoefixed charfie.There are examples of water markets throughout the world. These
range from the sale of tubewell water in India and Pakistan to water markets
in Spain which have been operated by local communities for centuries
[Maass and Anderson].
The Desire to Subsidize Food Production
Another factor that affects the charges for irrigation water is the
desire of a government to subsidize agricultural production. Several
reasons may account for these subsidies. If some countries subsidize their
agriculture, then it may be necessary for others to do the same simply to
compete. Also, farmers affected by large irrigation projects often have
little to say in project planning. If a government has non-agricultural
purposes for a large irrigation project such as keeping people out of the
cities, full employment, cheap food, and national defense, then recovery
of full costs from agricultural users is probably not reasonable.
A related question is who actually pays for the water? If land is
held by large land owners but operated by a large number of landless
laborers, who pays the charge, the land owner or the operator? Generally
the benefits will go to the land owner through higher rents and land
values. Thus charges should be collected from them, However, many time-s
the fees are charged the operator who has low income and little ability to
pay. Consequently many argue that the fees should be kept low so as
not to over-burden the small scale operator, This argument ignores the
fact that the real earners of economic surplus are not being charged and
many times have the political power to capture and keep most of the rent
created by the irrigation project.13
Another argument is that a major beneficiary of large investments
in agriculture are the consumers who often enjoy lower priced products.
Since society as a whole benefits, and farmers may just go on earning
competitive wages, society should pay for irrigation projects. The big
losers in this case would be the non-irrigated farmers who gain no increase
in productivity but suffer lower product prices. Largesuccessfulirrigation
projects that increase agricultural production a great deal may reduce
the incomes of farmers and reduce their ability to pay for those same
projects. If theseprojectsare tobe implemented,theymay have tobe subsidized.
The above argument assumes that the project is large enough to reduceproduct
prices significantlyand thatthe governmentwill not institutepoliciesto maintain
higher prices through price supports or increased exports.
The importance of these arguments depends a lot on the land ownership
and farm size. If most land is farmed by small owner operators, then who
pays and who benefits is not a serious problem. In addition, if increased
food production does decrease productprices, the small operator still benefits
from increased consumption.
Capacity of System
Even though the total social benefits of new irrigation projects
exceed the total costs, it may be difficult for governments to recover
from users the fixed costs of the installations. One reason is that
many irrigation systems are designed so that they will have excess capacity
most months of the year. Since it is difficult to predict such periods and
administer the required price flexibility, there is a tendency to cover the
capital costs from general revenues. Hence, water charges tend simply to14
reflect current operation and maintenance costs. Another alternative would
be to have two fees. One fee would be variable and tied to the operation
and maintenance costs while the other would be a fixed fee on land or
property to cover construction costs.
Traditions of ownership and Water Laws
Water rights and customs pertaining to the distribution of water
pften have evolved over many centuries. These rights appear to have had
a significant impact on the output of irrigation projects. Who owns the
water should influence thefees chargedandwilllikely influence the direct
and indirect economic activity created by irrigation. Three alternative
classes of ownership may be distinguished: private water rights, government
ownership, and open access.
1. Private property rights usually give land owners the right t~ set
quantities, shares or access to water, Knowledge of the amount of water
they can count an as a “right” or a certainty is crucial to farmers, particularly
th~se with perennial crops. This certainty can bring about increased invest-
ment in improving on-farm irrigation. In so doing it can provide the
basis for larger fees for irrigation water because of water’s higher value to
the farmer and the farmers increased ability to pay.
As a general rule, private owners should be willing to pay for improve-
ments in their irrigation system when they have requested the improvements.
Charging for water improvements will force users to avoid unreasonable
project demands, If water is free the value of the water rights will be
capitalized into the purchase price of farms. Should a government begin
charging what the water is worth after the land prices have been bid up, land
values will fall and some farmers may even be forced to sell their land.15
2. A system of government ownership implies that government has the
right to distribute water or to sell
water. Instead of selling rights or
attempt to ration water on the basis
rights to use water or a share of the
shares> governments generally
of cropping patterns and water
requirements of each crop. Regulations of this type can be used as in-
centives to grow crops that are deemed to be in the national interest.
Problems often arise in the estimation of individual crop irrigation require-
ments and in the supervision of individual farm usage, In some countries
government ownership is interpreted to mean “free water” for the farmers
who can capture it,
3. Open access means that the water is owned by anyone who can
capture and use it. Groundwater resources tend to be open access with the
water going to those who can pump it out. Lack of ownership and the fact
that if one farmer does not pump the water his neighborwill, can lead to
over-exploitationof groundwater resources. Water will be pumped to the
point where the marginal returns are equal to the pumping costs. Over
pumping can cause a rapidly dropping groundwater table and require farmers
to continually deepen their wells, Charging for the use of groundwater
is one means of reducing its over-exploitation;in fact, in some countries
such as Thailand it may be easier ta charge for pumped water than it is for
surface water. Another alternative is to tax the electricity or fuel used
to pumlpthe water,
Staff Training and Control Structures
The water charges used also depends on technology available to and
the ability and motivation of the people who run the system. Without
appropriate control structures and a trained staff it is very difficult to
deliver water to farmers at the time and in the quantities demanded. If16
water is not delivered in a timely manner it may be of little value to
farmers and the fees they are willing to pay will be low. Uncertainty of
water supply also may encourage farmers to use excess water when it is
available as insurance against future shortages. This leads to water
being wasted and to possible future drainage problems.
Operating an irrigation system so that the desired quantity of
water reaches each farmer at the appropriate time requires a considerable
amount of information flowing between the administrative staff and
farmers. Before farmers can finalize their cropping plans, they need to
know when and how much water they will receive. If they do not have this
information, they cannot be expected to make the best use of the water
received. On the other hand, the administrative staff must be aware of
cropping and weather conditions so water delivery schedules can be de-
signed to best fit cropping patterns and meet water demands.
A related issue is the ease of collecting the water charge or tax.
Ability to collect water charges is a difficult problem in many developing
countries. Farmersmay not pay because they are unhappy with the way water
is delivered or simply because of the lack of any effective collection
agency in rural areas. Very likely as system management and operation is
improved through training and investment in control structures collections
will go up [Abel? 1976].
Return Flow and Draina& ——
Charges for irrigation may have to be adjusted because of secondary
effects such as the re-use of water downstream and drainage problems.
Only part of the water delivered evaporates or is absorbed by crops. “The
rest is returned on or through the ground to some water course or aquiferwhere, if its quality permits, it may be used again. When a second
diversion of the water is made, the same situation is repeated with the
diminished quantity (and quality) of water.
“If these possibilities of re-use all occur within the legal control
of the initial buyer of the water (e.g., on his property), his willingness
to pay would reflect t’henet values generated through re-use. However, when
the return flow escapes the initial buyer by passing over (or under) his
property line, his willingness to pay will omit the net values generated
by the return flow” [Howe and Easter, p. 24].
Drainage problems are the opposite side of the return flow situation.
The water not evaporated or absorbed by the crops may accumulate in the
ground and raise the water table or flood low areas and cause crop
damage and salt accumulation.
Positive externalities, such as useful return flows, mean that
irrigation water has a higher value to society than the charge that the
farmer is willing to pay. Negative side effects,such as a drainage
problem, suggest restrictions on wasteful usage upstream or raising the
charge to upstream farmers to encourage them to use less water.
Level of Charges
There are a number of criteria which have been suggested as means
for setting the level of the irrigation water charges. Fees based on
target revenues, benefits, total costs and marginal costs are discussed below.
First the fees could be set to meet a given target revenue. This could I
be enough revenue to cover operating and maintenance costs or possibly enough
to cover the full cost of the
be dividedby acres irrigatedor
acreor percubicmetercharge.
project. Oncethe targetrevenuers set thenit can
averagevolume ofwater deliveredto obtaina perI 18
I
Ben~fit pricing is used to recover all or part of the economic rent .
or suplus Igeneratedby the irrigation project. The magnitude of the fees
are relat~d to actual on-farm production levels. Charges can be calculated
on the ba~is of marginal returns per unit of water or gross returns. The
government authority who buys the agricultural
water cha~ge as a precentage of gross returns.
products, can deduct the
Alt~rnatively the charges can be based on net returns from irrigation.
Net retu~s per unit of water pr~vide anupper limiton water chargessince they
reflect the maximum amount a farmer would be willing to pay, Net returns
could be @stimated as the difference in net income with and without irriga-
tzan, Alternatively net returns could be the residual after costs other




vary among farmers and may be difficult to calculate. The
involved in having different chargesamongfarmersusuallyleads tO
based on the average net benefits in a re~ion or area.
Tot$l cost pricing is another alternative which could result in fees
ve~~ sjmLI.~ar to those ~btatned by target revenues. In total cost pricing,
I
opexatingiand maintenance costs plus a charge for capital costs are divided
up among $ndividual farmers. The water fee then bec~mes the sum of these
costs divqded by the acres irrigated. Thus the level of the charge is based
on how nu+h of the project costs are to be covered by the irrigated farmers.
+
F&inal cost charges are in theory based on the cost of adding another






possible because of the large lumpy investments required to increase
water supplies. At best one may be able to talk about incremental
several thousand cubic meters of water, The cost of adding19
another unit would be the appropriate fee when present facilities are being
used to full capacity. If additional water can be provided by adopting water
conservation practices then the cost of the lowest cost practices is an
appropriate measure of marginal costs.
In an existing irrigation project with a fixed and not fully utilized
capacity, marginal costs will equal operating and maintenance costs that
are incurred to deliver water. Thus, the marginal cost would only include
a charge for capital costs during periods when the project is used to full
capacity. When there is excess capacity the rate will drop to the operating
cQst plus some maintenance costs.
For cases where the facilities are never used to full capacity the
water rate based on marginal cost should not include any charge for capital.
The capital (fixed)costof theproject should be covered by othermeans such as a
land tax? a betterment level or general revenues,
Conclusion
Many problems will continue to face irrigation planners, managers and
administrators. Unfortunately, there is a basic lack of understandingof
the value of water. J?eoplestill do not understand that water occurring
naturally in a region is worth just as much as water that is conveyed there
at high cost and should be priced accordingly, Otherwise YOU will be faced
with the situation where water is being wasted by farmers in one area and
thQse right next dQor do not have enough.
If a project is properly conceived, designed and implemented, it should
create an economic surplus. If it does not, it should not have been built.
“Water in locations where water is scarce is a rent-bearing resource.
Developing water need not, therefore, require subsidy; on the contrary, it
can yield a surplus” [Gaffney, p. 142]. Therefore, irrigation planners20
should begin considering the possibilities for collecting the rent while
the project is being designed. The design will influence what charges
are possible. In fact, a certain amount of project flexibility should be
considered at the design stage so that the project can accommodate different
allocation procedures and water charges,
Finally, the use of more flexible fee schedules need to be given
serious consideration for two reasons: First flexible fees can be used
as a means fm improved water allocation, Peak water demands can be reduced
by charging higher fees during periods when the system’s capacity is over-
loaded (the dry season). price rationing tends to be superior inmumy
respects to alternative rationing methods, The absence of any rationing
procedure for dry periods leads to a great waste in unneeded storage capacity
[Gaffney, p. 144].
The other important reason for flexibility in charges is to allow for
revisions over time, Clearly as inflation continues there will be a
need to increase fees if only to be able to cover the increased operating
and maintenance costs. To set a fixed per acre or even per cubic meter
charge would seem to be short-sighted. Thus, farmers should know from the
beginning that charges will be flexible and at least partly tied to increasing
costs* Otherwise farmers will protest loudly every time irrigation officials
talk of new, higher water charges.RE)?ERENCES
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